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Abstract
As an archipelagic country, Indonesia has more maritime boundaries than land boundaries. 
There are 10 countries directly adjacent to Indonesia. Of those countries, Indonesia has just 
reached a few conclusive bilateral arrangements on maritime boundaries. Many unresolved and 
potential disputes are there that may arise in the future. Two ways have been used to negotiate 
Indonesia’s maritime boundaries: (1) bilateral talks that result in bilateral agreements and (2) 
dispute settlement through an international tribunal. However, for more than 50 years, these two 
methods have not optimally provided the expected result. In fact, the islands of Sipadan-Ligitan 
have been gone to Malaysia after Indonesia lost in the International Court of Justice. Creating 
a joint development zone will be good alternative mechanism proposed for the Indonesian 
government to resolve its dispute especially in an area that has natural resources. Indonesia 
once created a bilateral treaty on joint development zone with Australia on the Timor Gap and 
in fact, the treaty was considered a good example. Malaysia-Thailand and Malaysia-Vietnam 
are among the real examples in the implementation of joint development zones that still ongoing 
until today. Looking at the advantages and disadvantages of this zone, this alternative dispute 
resolution may be considered to provide the best solution for disputed countries. Moreover, 
this is supported by Article 74 paragraph 3 and Article 83 paragraph 3 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982. The creation of relevant and effective 
agreement, regulatory and institutional frameworks becomes the Indonesian government’s 
homework to optimize this mechanism.
Keywords: Joint Development Zone, Agreement, Disputes, Exclusive Economic Zone, 
Continental Shelf. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Indonesia, known for its archipelago, has the number of 17,500 
islands from the west end (Sabang, the Province of Aceh) to the east 
one (Merauke, the Province of Papua).1 Most of Indonesia territory is 
adjacent by the sea of neighboring countries. The archipelagic country 
has its own sea border with 10 countries including Malaysia, Australia, 
1  Tim Viva, Catat, Ini Jumlah Pulau di Indonesia yang Sebenarnya, Viva, 20 June 
2017, <http://www.viva.co.id/berita/nasional/927968-catat-ini-jumlah-pulau-di-indo-
nesia-yang-sebenarnya>, accessed on 13 August 2017. The data is revealed by the 
Centre of Hydrography and Oceanography of Indonesia Marine (Pusat Hidrografi 
dan Oseanografi-PUSHIDROSAL). 
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Timor Leste, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, India, Republic of 
Palau, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Three of ten neighboring 
countries such as Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, and Timor Leste are 
also adjacent to Indonesia in terms of land boundaries.
To determine its own state territory, Indonesia must comply with 
the bilateral, regional and multilateral arrangement in an exception if 
there is no state adjacent to Indonesia. Determination land boundaries 
are set from the Netherlands East Indies map, bilateral agreement 
and arbitration award or international court decision. The Principle 
of International Law of Uti Possidetis Juris is already applied.2 To 
determine maritime boundaries, the three former way to determine land 
boundaries and provisions in the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982 along with multilateral agreement must be 
used. Given the obligation to achieve interstate agreement on marine 
boundary delimitation, every government has a heavy challenge to 
overcome. UNCLOS 1982 give all coastal states the right to explore and 
to exploit in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the Continental 
Shelf up to 200 nautical miles and 350 nautical miles respectively from 
their baseline.3
In terms of sea boundaries or marine delimitation, Indonesia has not 
fully reached conclusive terms with the ten neighboring countries. In 
fact, the archipelagic country has not pursued any bilateral talks with 
Timor Leste and the Republic of Palau in terms of marine delimitation.4 
2  Malcolm N. Shaw states that the principle of uti possidetis juris is an attempt to 
eliminate territorial disputes by obtaining the territorial heritage of new states at the 
time of independence and converting existing boundaries into globally recognized 
state borders. Please see Malcolm N. Shaw; The Heritage of States: The Principle 
of Uti Possidetis Juris Today, British Yearbook of International Law, Volume 67, Is-
sue 1, 1 January 1997, p. 76, < https://doi.org/10.1093/bybil/67.1.75>, accessed on 20 
August 2017.
3  Clive H. Schofield, Bluring the lines: maritime joint development and the coopera-
tive management of ocean resources, Issues in Legal Scholarship, 8(1), Article 3, p. 2. 
Please see also Leonardo Bernard, Prospect for Joint Development in the South China 
Sea, paper submitted for the “Managing Tensions in the South China Sea”, a confer-
ence held by CSIS on 5-6 June 2013, p. 2.
4  Iwan Santosa, Batas Laut RI dan 10 Negara Belum Tuntas, Kompas, 25 Febru-
ary 2013, <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/02/25/21263866/Batas.Laut.
RI.dan.10.Negara.Belum.Tuntas>, accessed on 20 August 2017.
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From this situation, the potential for disputes remains there even 
though no current debates on marine boundaries arising. Nonetheless, 
it is possible that the legal action will occur if there are natural and 
hydrocarbon resources discovered within the boundary zone. One of 
the notable disputes over these resources is the Ambalat zone disputed 
by Indonesia and Malaysia in the Sulawesi Sea. The two countries use 
the same legal basis to acquire the resources inter alia the rights to 
exercise, explore and exploit resources in EEZ.5 
In addition to previous disputes resolution, there is another way used 
by various countries in the world and it has been a panacea to overcome 
the disputes for temporary manner. This way is by establishing a joint 
development arrangement (JDA) or joint development zone (JDZ) 
on disputed maritime areas.6 Arrangement of JDZ is considered to 
be an effective way not only for marine boundaries delimitation but 
also for land boundaries dispute. Specifically, JDA on the land border 
is implemented from the concept of Special Border Economic Zone 
(SBEZ). 
The concept, implementation and institutional frameworks of JDZ 
and SBEZ is almost similar. What distinguishes JDZ and SBEZ is the 
type of zone will be built and the purpose of it. JDZ is established to 
jointly manage, govern, explore, and exploit living and non-living 
marine natural and hydrocarbon resources such as oil and gas, while 
SBEZ is built to accelerate cross-border and international trade as well 
as to improve people welfare near the border. SBEZ consists of sectors 
5  John G. Butcher, The International Court of Justice and the Territorial Dispute 
Between Indonesia and Malaysia in the Sulawesi Sea, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 
Vol. 35, No. 2 (2013), p. 239, 249-251. Please see also Stephen C. Druce and Efri Yoni 
Baikoeni, Circumventing Conflict: the Indonesia-Malaysia Ambalat Block Dispute, 
Chapter 7, p. 138-139, inside Mikio Oishi (ed.) Contemporary Conflicts in Southeast 
Asia: Towards a New ASEAN Way of Conflct of Management, Inistitute of Asian Stud-
ies, Singapore: Springer Science+Business Media, 2016: pp 137-156.
6  Clive H. Schofield, Bluring the lines: maritime joint development and the coopera-
tive management of ocean resources, p. 24-25. Please see also Junaido Bello Mar-
shall, Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas in the Gulf of Guinea: A Case of 
Energy Security for Nigeria and Cameroon, (2014) 32 Journal of Law, Policy and 
Globalization, p. 141 & 146. See also Leonardo Bernard, Prospect for Joint Develop-
ment in the South China Sea, p. 8.  For this article purpose, the term of JDZ will be 
used more often than JDA.
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of an industrial park, tourism, a border town, residential, logistic, 
traditional market and so on.7 
II.THE CONCEPT OF JOINT DEVELOPMENT ZONE
A. DEFINITION AND  LEGAL BASIS
There is no formal definition of JDZ. Biang and Miyoshi define the 
JDZ concept differently but their meaning is similar. Biang mentions 
that JDZ is a joint arrangement to establish joint jurisdiction over the 
maritime area where such cooperation is undertaken based on Article 74 
paragraph 3 of UNCLOS 1982.8 Different from Biang, Miyoshi explains 
that JDZ or JDA is ‘an intergovernmental arrangement of provisional 
nature, designed for functional purposes of joint exploration for and/
or exploitation of hydrocarbons resources of the sea bed beyond the 
territorial sea.’9 In general, JDZ is a type of cooperation between one 
government and another government that has a dispute over maritime 
territorial boundaries by making an agreement to build, to develop and 
to govern or manage jointly the disputed zones or areas. These areas 
usually contain living natural resources such as abundant stock of fish 
and also contain non-living resources such as oil and gas along with 
7  Montague J. Lord & Pawat Tangtrongjita, Special Border Economic Zone (SBEZ) 
in the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT), Munich Personal 
RePEC Archive(MPRA), MPRA Paper No. 61060, 15 May 2014, <https://mpra.
ub.uni-muenchen.de/61060/1/MPRA_paper_61060.pdf>,  p. 4-5,  accessed on 17 
July 2017.
8  J. Tangia Biang, The Joint Development Zone Between Nigeria and Sao Tome and 
Principe: A Case of Provisional Arrangement in The Gulf of Guinea International 
Law, State Practice and Prospects for Regional Integration,  The United Nations – 
The Nippon Foundation of Japan Fellowship Programme 2009-2010, Division for 
Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, New York:United 
Nations, 2010, p. 54, <http://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/
fellows_pages/fellows_papers/tanga_0910_cameroon.pdf>, accessed on 28 August 
2017.
9  Junaido Bello Marshall, Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas in the Gulf 
of Guinea: A Case of Energy Security for Nigeria and Cameroon, p. 142. Please see 
Miyoshi’s original definition from Masahiro Miyoshi, The Joint Development of Off-
shore Oil and Gas in Relation to Martime Boundary Delimitation, Maritime Briefing, 
Vol. 2 No. 5, International Boundaries Research Unit, Department of Geography, Uni-




As the legal basis for JDZ, Article 74 paragraph 3 and Article 83 
paragraph 3 of UNCLOS 1982 provide clear provision for coastal states 
to pursue any efforts in practical nature to cooperate with neighboring 
country when no deal or consensus   been reached for maritime 
delimitation. The former article regulates arrangement for disputes in 
EEZ, while the latter one sets it for disputes in the continental shelf. The 
arrangement must be held in the spirit of understanding and cooperation. 
The disputed countries are prohibited to jeopardize or to hamper each 
other by taking actions that are harmful or deterring efforts to achieve 
final consensus or agreement on maritime delimitation in EEZ and also 
continental shelf.10 These articles encourage coastal states that have 
not been able to resolve their disputes to use convenient, flexible and 
conducive ways. No formal or standard forms specified by the articles. 
However, many countries use bilateral agreements or memorandum of 
understanding to achieve consensus on their points of intent.
The existence of JDZ cannot be separated from the presence of natural 
resources lying on or under the seabed of adjacent EEZ and continental 
shelf. Initially, the adjacent states do not intensely pay attention to their 
maritime border delimitation. They start to care and pay attention when 
there is a discovery of hidden natural resources including oil, gas and 
hydrocarbon resources and one of the adjacent states begins granting a 
concession to private sectors to make exploration and or exploitation of 
those non-living resources in disputed EEZ or continental shelf area. A 
country whose territories claimed by others surely unhappy and protest. 
It is not possible that the country prepares and sends its military vessels 
and aircraft to the disputed area. The claimant country certainly does 
not want to lose its face or dignity on its investors. To overcome the 
situation, the effort to discuss and talk bilaterally including to develop 
joint cooperation on the disputed zone is necessary and shall be done.
Addressing the issues to an arbitration panel or international 
10  Article 74 paragraph 3 and Article 83 paragraph mention similar provisions: “Pend-
ing agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States concerned, in a spirit of 
understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional ar-
rangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize 
or hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be without 
prejudice to the final delimitation.” 
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courts for getting a best decision is sometimes not the best way to 
achieve. Disputes between two bordering states can explode to be a 
war. If one state wins the dispute and it is entitled rights to rule the 
disputed areas, arbitral or tribunal ruling may not be enforceable. This 
is what happened in the South China Sea after the Philippines won a 
dispute over Scarborough Shoal where China refused to implement 
the arbitration award. In fact, the Philippines has already set aside the 
ruling on Scarborough Shoal.11 In addition, new potential disputes will 
re-emerge as the marine territory (EEZ and continental shelf) of the 
country awarded automatically increases. The territory may overlap with 
adjacent countries. This has already happened between Indonesia and 
Malaysia after the International Court of Justice (ICJ) grant Malaysia to 
rule the Islands of Sipadan and Ligitan near the Borneo Island and the 
Sulawesi Sea.12
Discussing joint development cooperation on disputed areas or 
zones surely provides more benefits rather than negotiating to defend 
respective opinions on territorial claims. The negotiators can sit 
together to discuss the prospect of resolution that can give advantages 
for adjacent states and even they can conduct joint cooperation in 
ruling and governing the disputed areas. The result of the negotiation 
is set forth in bilateral agreement or, in any case, if there are more than 
two disputed coastal states, multilateral agreement. Every state may 
delegate its representative in a joint commission or authority to manage 
JDZ. In a period of around 30 to 50 years, the disputed countries can 
obtain positive achievement from their cooperation rather than defend 
the ego on claiming the areas. The cooperation between Malaysia and 
11  Please see Tom Phillips, Oliver Holmes & Owen Bowcott, Beijing rejects tribunal’s 
ruling in South China case, The Guardian, 12 July 2016, <https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2016/jul/12/philippines-wins-south-china-sea-case-against-china>, ac-
cessed on 20 August 2017. See also Associated Press, Philippines to ‘set aside’ South 
China sea tribunal ruling to avoid imposing on Beijing, The Guardian, 17 December 
2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/17/philippines-to-set-aside-
south-china-sea-tribunal-ruling-to-avoid-imposing-on-beijing>, accessed on 20 Au-
gust 2017.
12  John G. Butcher, The International Court of Justice and the Territorial Dispute 
Between Indonesia and Malaysia in the Sulawesi Sea. . Please see also Stephen C. 




Thailand on the Gulf of Thailand is one positive example of such joint 
arrangement.
B. BRIEF HISTORY OF JDZ
There are some differences of opinion as to when the JDZ concept is 
applied for the first time on disputed maritime areas. Miyoshi explained 
that the JDZ for the first time was arranged by Japan and South Korea 
in 1974 over the continental shelf located in the southern part of the 
sea of Japan and the eastern sea of South Korea.13 This is based on 
the precedents and studies he did. Different to Miyoshi, Biang, and 
Schofield stated that the implementation of JDZ was first applied in 
the Persian Gulf between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in 1958 and later 
followed by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 1965. 14 Regardless of which 
countries started first in making JDZ, this concept has long existed since 
some decades ago and even before the UNCLOS 1982 were enteredinto 
force to all coastal states.
Japan and South Korea disagreed over the boundaries of the 
respective continental shelf. Japan prefers to use the principle of 
equidistance or median line as its solution. In contrast to Japan, South 
Korea insists that the boundary line is influenced by geophysical 
factors. To overcome the deadlock, the two East Asian countries agreed 
to enter into a written agreement to work together to build and manage 
the disputed territory. This agreement is intended to facilitate the 
exploration and exploitation of oil and gas on the seabed for 50 years 
and can be extended. Institutionally, Japan and South Korea set up a 
joint commission consisting of representatives of both government as a 
liaison for them.15     
13  Masahiro Miyoshi, The Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas in Relation 
to Martime Boundary Delimitation, p. 1. See also Clive Schofield, Defining Areas 
for Joint Development in Disputed Waters, inside S. WU & N. Hong (Eds.), Recent 
Developments in the South China Sea Dispute: the Prospect of a Joint Development 
Regime, London: Routledge, 2014: pp 78-98.
14  J. Tangia Biang, The Joint Development Zone Between Nigeria and Sao Tome and 
Principe: A Case of Provisional Arrangement in The Gulf of Guinea International 
Law, State Practice and Prospects for Regional Integration, p. 55. See also See also 
Clive Schofield, Defining Areas for Joint Development in Disputed Waters.
15  Please see Clive Schofield, Defining Areas for Joint Development in Disputed Wa-
ters. See also  S.P. Jagota, Maritime Boundary and Joint Development Zones: Emerg-
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In West Asia region, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain entered into  joint 
development cooperation on a marine territory near the Persian Gulf in 
1958. This agreement, according to Schofield, is the world’s first JDZ 
agreement despite the management of Fasht Abu-Sa’fah oil and gas 
blocks is in the hand of Saudi Arabia (single state management). Bahrain 
is not involved in managing the block. Nevertheless, the agreement was 
successfully implemented until now.16
In the Southeast Asia region, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand are 
the first three coastal states that establish JDZ. In fact, JDZ agreements 
made and arranged by these countries are considered to be the most 
sophisticated, complex and modelable agreements for arranging and 
establishing JDZ in the world.17 Indonesia once agreed to develop JDZ 
together with Australia in the Timor Sea in 1989 through the Treaty 
between Australia and Indonesia on the Zone of Cooperation in an 
Area between the Indonesia Province of East Timor and Northern 
Australia. Malaysia dan Thailand agreed to create JDZ in the Gulf 
of Thailand in 1979 through Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
on the Establishment of a Joint Authority for the Exploitation of the 
Resources of the Seabed in a Defined Area of the Continental Shelf in 
the Gulf of Thailand. The MoU was then followed up by the agreement 
on the constitution and other related matters to the establishment of the 
Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority signed in 1990.
Concerning the Timor gap, Australia has been negotiating since 1972 
with Portugal, which then continued with Indonesia after the integration 
of East Timor into Indonesia in 1975. Along with the development 
of international maritime law where UNCLOS was adopted in 1982, 
negotiations on the Timor gap were deadlock. To break the deadlock, 
an agreement was made on the JDZ with the concept of Zone of 
ing Trends, p 122, inside Ocean Yearbook, Vol. 10, Issue 1, Chicago: University of 
Chicago, 1993: p. 110-131.
16  Please see Clive Schofield, Defining Areas for Joint Development in Disputed Wa-
ters. See also Yu Hui, Joint Development of Mineral Resources – An Asian Solution?, 
p. 91, inside Ko Swan Sik et. al (eds.), Asian Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 2, 
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1994: pp 87-112.
17  Clive Schofield, Defining Areas for Joint Development in Disputed Waters. See 
also David M. Ong, The 1979 and 1990 Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development Agree-
ments: A Model for International Legal Co-operation in Common Offshore Petroleum 
Deposits?, (1999) 14 (2) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, p. 245. 
Cooperation. The Zone of Cooperation is divided into three sub-zones 
namely: (1) Zone A which is a neutral territory of sovereignty, where 
the revenue is divided equally 50:50; (2) Zone B in the southern part 
of Timor Sea with the ratio of 90:10 (Australia obtains 90%); and 
(3) Zone C in the northern part of Timor Sea with the ratio of 90:10 
(Indonesia obtains 90%). This agreement was signed in 1989 for a term 
of 40 years and can be extended for another 20 years. Institutionally, the 
two countries agreed to establish two institutional models in the form 
of a ministerial council and joint authority (bicameral). The relation 
amongst both is in the form of subordination from the former to the 
latter. After East Timor Province was released from Indonesia and 
become an independent country of the Democratic Republic of Timor 
Leste, this agreement was replaced by agreement between Australia and 
this new country. 18
Prior to Indonesia and Australia, Malaysia and Thailand agreed 
to create JDZ through an MoU on oil and gas blocks management. 
Although the MoU was signed in 1979, the implementation of the 
cooperation and ratification could be implemented in 1990. The two 
countries formed the Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority (MTJA) 
which could act on behalf of the two countries in granting the block 
management concession to investors. MTJA consists of representatives 
from Malaysia and Thailand with the same composition and co-chaired 
by the two state representatives.19 
III.MARINE BOUNDARIES REGULATION IN INDONESIA
The legal regime of maritime boundaries in Indonesia consists of the 
state territory law and maritime law. Each regime has its own legal and 
institutional arrangements. The first legal regime includes provisions of 
state territory regulated in Law No. 43/2008 with the National Agency 
for Border Management (BNPP) chaired by the Minister of Home 
18  Anthony Heiser, East Timor and the Joint Petroleum Development Area, (2003) 54 
(17) The Maritime Law Association Australia and New Zealand Journal, p. 59-61. See 
also Clive Schofield, Defining Areas for Joint Development in Disputed Waters. See 
also S.P. Jagota, Maritime Boundary and Joint Development Zones: Emerging Trends.
19  Nguyen Hong Thao, ‘Joint Development in the Gulf of Thailand’ (1999) (3) IBRU 
Boundary and Security Bulletin Autumn, p 79-82.
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Affairs as a state institution for governing Indonesia border. The next 
legal regime includes more regulations comprising Law No. 5/1983 on 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ Law), Law No. 17/1985 on Ratification 
of UNCLOS, Law No. 6/1996 on Territorial Water (the Territorial Water 
Law 1996) and Law No. 32/2014 on Maritime (the Maritime Law 2014). 
One regulation complements the others, however, all of them refer to 
UNCLOS 1982. Institutionally, the regulations mandate the Minister of 
Marine Affairs and Fisheries as regulators in the maritime sector and 
the Marine Security Agency (Bakamla) as authority for securing and 
enforcing the law at the sea.20 
The State Territory Law regulates state border’s line, jurisdictional 
boundaries, sovereign rights of states, border zones and authorized 
institutions on the border. The territory of the country includes land 
territory, inland waters, archipelagic waters, and territorial sea along 
with the land beneath and airspace above them including all natural 
resources contained therein.21 The jurisdictional boundary covers 
territory outside the real territory of the State which includes the EEZ, 
continental shelf and contiguous zone where the state has sovereign 
rights and certain power on these zones in accordance with applicable 
regulations and international law.22 Indonesia’s sovereign right rests on 
“the territory of the country” and “jurisdictional territory”. The border 
zone or area is determined from the borders of the country located on 
the inner side along the border of Indonesia with other countries.23 In 
the State Territory Law, the territory of the country does not include the 
jurisdictional territory.
Almost the same as the State Territorial Law, regulations in the 
maritime sector such as the Territorial Water Law 1996 and the Maritime 
Law 2014 also regulate the sovereignty rights of Indonesia including in 
territorial borders, contiguous zones, EEZ, and continental shelf. Based 
on the Maritime Law 2014, it is possible for governments to cooperate 
with other countries in bilateral, regional, and multilateral frameworks 
in managing marine natural resources. The resources here include 
20  Article 1 paragraph 14 and Article 59 paragraph 3 of Law No. 32/2014 on Maritime.
21  Article 1 paragraph 1 of Law No. 43/2008 on State Territory.
22  Article 1 paragraph 3 of Law No. 43/2008 on State Territory.
23  Article 1 paragraph 6 of Law No. 43/2008 on State Territory.
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renewable resources and non-renewable ones such as oil and gas. 24 This 
provision provides the legitimate basis for the Indonesian government 
to create JDZ on the disputed maritime territory. Nevertheless, the 
institutional authority related to the marine sector is in the Ministry of 
Marine Affairs and Fisheries. 25
Specifically, with regard to border institutions, the border law 
regime and the maritime law regime have two different authorities. 
BNPP focuses on border management, but the border areas are managed 
only to the territorial sea and not to the additional zones, ZEE, and 
the continental shelf. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Marine Affairs and 
Fisheries has the authority to utilize and manage marine resources 
including cooperation with other countries for such management. Of 
the two institutional regimes, the ministries of marine and fisheries 
have more authority than BNPP.
Specifically, in regards to its institutionally, the state territory and 
maritime legal regimes have two different authorities. BNPP is more 
focus on managing or governing the Indonesian border. However, the 
border areas governed by BNPP are only at the territorial sea and cannot 
cover contiguous zone, EEZ and continental shelf.26 The Ministry of 
Marine Affairs and Fisheries has the authority to utilize and manage 
marine resources including cooperation with other countries for such 
management. Of the two institutional regimes, the ministry of marine 
affairs and fisheries has more authority than BNPP.
The availability of regulation on borders and maritime is certainly 
better than not regulated at all. In fact, when Indonesia agreed on 
cooperation with Australia on Timor Gap in 1989, the government only 
bases itself on the EEZ Law 1983 and the UNCLOS Ratification Law 
1985. Without adequate regulation and sufficient legal guidance, the 
24  Article 1 paragraph 7 and Article 41 paragraph 3 of Law No. 32/2014 on Maritime.
25  Article 1 paragraph 14 of Law No. 32/2014 on Maritime..
26  This is derived from Article 1 paragraph 1 of Law No. 43/2008 on State Territory 
which mentions that Indonesia’s state territory covers land, internal waters, island 
waters and territorial sea including the seabed and under the seabed along with the air 
space above them and all natural resources contained therein. According to the State 
Territory Law, the BNPP has only has authority to govern the border in state terri-
tory defined by this Law and cannot govern jurisdictional territory covering contigous 
zone, EEZ and continental shelf.
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government successfully negotiated its wishes which then materialized 
as a cooperation agreement on oil and gas block management. In fact, 
agreements made and signed by Indonesia and Australia are considered 
as model agreements for other JDZ development in the world. 27 This is 
due to the complexity of the negotiations undertaken by both countries 
including the status of Indonesia as invaders of East Timor and the 
country is deemed as an illegitimate representative for the agreement 
on that period. 28
IV.REGULATORY ARRANGEMENT OF JDZ IN INDONESIA
In the context of JDZ, regulations of state territory and maritime 
can be the main regulations for government to implement Article 74 
paragraph 3 and Article 83 paragraph 3 of UNCLOS 1982. However, the 
two regulations do provide detail provisions in terms of JDZ. In order 
to operationalize the government to establish the JDZ, the supporting 
regulations must be drafted and promulgated. This is necessary to 
prepare Indonesia government to face and negotiate neighboring state 
when maritime disputes re-emerge and Indonesia takes the option 
to use this alternative way. Likewise, these supporting regulations 
can also determine relevant ministries or agencies. The Ministry of 
Marine Affairs and Fisheries is the main authority in the marine sector. 
However, due to the complexity of border management covering not 
only the marine sector but also the energy sector and mineral resources 
along with defense and security, the involvement of other ministries or 
institutions is a necessity. To that end, the government is possible to 
create a special team or task force to be JDZ regulator chaired by the 
Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries or the Ministry of Energy and 
Mineral Resources.
If there is a need of supporting regulation for the establishment of 
JDZ and its institutional framework, what should be regulated in this 
supporting regulation? Is it necessary to fully adopt what Indonesia 
and Australia had made relating to agreements on the Timor gap? 
Is JDZ institutional formation unicameral or bicameral? Is JDZ 
27  Clive Schofield, Defining Areas for Joint Development in Disputed Waters.
28  S.P. Jagota, Maritime Boundary and Joint Development Zones: Emerging Trends.
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institutional function authoritative or merely consultative? Is there 
a space of flexibility for government to negotiate clauses with other 
countries without being strictly bound by this supporting regulation? 
All of the questions are relevant to be answered if Indonesia has the 
willingness to draft and to promulgate supporting regulations for JDZ 
operationalization.
Referring to the example agreement between Indonesia-Australia 
and Malaysia-Thailand related to JDZ, main provisions that can be 
arranged are as follows:
1. Definition of cooperation and JDZ itself. These are important to 
confirm what is meant by the cooperation and JDZ to be formed;
2. Type of sectors that can be co-operated through JDZ. In this 
provision, it is important for the government to determine what can 
be co-operated and not at all. In the event that there is a need in the 
future that requires the government to cooperate and the sector in 
cooperation has not been covered, there should be flexibility for the 
government to implement cooperation on sectors not covered. 
3. Power and flexibility of negotiation for the government in 
determining the contents of the agreement. This is important for the 
government to have space and to innovate in negotiating Indonesian 
national interests against other countries;
4. The options to establish “unicameral” or  “bicameral” joint 
institution. In general, JDZ agreements have unicameral institutional 
frameworks such as the Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority and the 
Saudi-Sudanese Joint Commission. However, a bicameral form is 
used also by coastal states such as Indonesia-Australia that establish 
Ministerial Council and Joint Authority and Timor Leste-Australia 
with similar form (the difference is only on the nomenclature of 
joint commission). Indonesia should provide a flexible regulatory 
arrangement in order to have an institutional form that is in line with 
the context of the problems encountered;
5. Choice of institutional function model whether authoritative body 
or consultative body or a combination of both. The option is tailored 
to the context of the problem and must, of course, be in accordance 
with the duties, functions and authorities of each government agency 
based on applicable regulations;
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6. The rights of the government to appoint representative ministry/
institution and local government to sit in JDZ’s institutional board. 
The government, in this case, the President, should be given the 
authority to appoint who is the most relevant or right person as 
JDZ institutional board. It is possible that there could have different 
parties or persons sitting in the various board of joint authority and 
or ministerial council of JDZ;
7. The choice of law will be applied. This provision is important to 
emphasize in the territories in which Indonesian law will apply and in 
which territory the applicable foreign law will apply. In addition, the 
provision should provide authority for the government to negotiate 
the choice of law applicable on the block or zone considered neutral; 
and
8. Dispute resolution options. This provision is to affirm the choice 
of dispute resolution to be pursued and the adjustment in the JDZ 
agreement on the freedom of the parties in determining the desired 
venue and dispute resolution institution.
The proposed arrangement is not an exhaustive list. Surely, it is open 
to other suggestions and recommendations for the arrangement of JDZ 
and its agreements with other countries. In addition, there is a possibility 
too that the rest of the arrangement is left to the negotiating parties. 
The proposed arrangement is made to facilitate the government in the 
future in negotiating with other adjacent coastal states. In Indonesia 
administrative law, the existence of such arrangement is important as 
the legal basis for government legitimacy and accountability to take 
progressive action including in terms of policy and funding. The absence 
of it may prevent the government from taking actions that would benefit 
and protect Indonesia’s national interests.
V.CONCLUSION
JDZ is widely recognized by various countries in the world to be 
an alternative means of cooperation that can benefit disputing coastal 
states regarding the delimitation of EEZ or continental shelf. Although 
its nature is provisional, JDZ is a logical and rational need in practice. 
Through the formulation of a two-pronged profit sharing clause, the 
two disputing countries are encouraged to remain happy for at least two 
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things: (1) the revenue of the state from joint management of marine 
resources; and (2) peace over the disputed marine territories. Profitable 
cooperation is better than war-torn disputes.
Most countries do not want conflict or dispute to happen with 
neighboring countries that lead to war. The settling process through 
bilateral meetings until the submission of a dispute to international 
tribunal or arbitration is sometimes not the best course. Arbitral 
award or international court decision only provides win or lose 
verdict that could have an adverse effect on neighboring countries. 
The establishment of JDZ becomes an effective practical solution 
to temporarily stop the dispute and reduce the tension that exists in 
two or more neighboring coastal states involved. For Indonesia, the 
experience of losing of Sipadan and Ligitan Islands to Malaysia and 
Indonesia-Australia agreement on the Timor gap are a valuable lesson 
on how to resolve disputes with neighboring countries. Forming a JDZ 
can provide mutual benefits and can be alternative way besides using 
the way of: (1) bilateral talks that result in bilateral agreements; and 
(2) dispute settlement resolution through an international tribunal or 
arbitration. Arrangement in internal regulation is surely necessary for 
the government to have a legal basis and pathway to materialize JDZ 
that protects national and people interests.
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